Parallel Debates: A Methodological Proposal


Doenças mentais; raça; gênero; categorias sociais; filosofia da psiquiatria; metodologia filosófica. Mental illness; race; gender; social categories; philosophy of psychiatry; philosophical methodology. Enfermedad mental; raza; género; categorías sociales; filosofía de la psiquiatría; metodología filosófica.

How to Cite

Nakaya-Perez, I. (2022). Parallel Debates: A Methodological Proposal. Resistances. Journal of the Philosophy of History, 3(6), e21096.


Social ontology focuses on questions about the reality of human categories. The typical examples are gender and race. Common questions about them are: Do they exist? What is their nature? Do they exist in the best possible way? Meanwhile, the philosophy of psychiatry has been discussing the reality of psychopathology, what is the best way to classify mental disorders, and whether it is possible to define them without normative vocabulary. I think there is something not only strange but inadequate about these discussions being held apart. Particularly, I hold that by being held separately these discussions are philosophically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that these debates are parallel in crucial aspects, but more importantly that they can benefit from each other if they start a dialogue. I suggest some paths we can take to start fruitful discussions and offer examples of the kind of outcomes we can expect. However, my main contribution is to sketch a common framework to map current discussions, make comparisons between them, and, more importantly, guide new research.


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Copyright (c) 2022 Itsue Nakaya-Perez


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