Resistances. Journal of the Philosophy of History <p><strong>Resistances (ISSN 2737-6222)</strong>, is a refereed academic journal that publishes two issues per year (January-July and August-December) in Spanish, Portuguese, and English. It is edited by the Centro de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales de América Latina (CICSHAL-RELIGACIÓN), a center associated to CLACSO. The journal is inspired by the resistance experience of Dolores Cacuango, who promoted processes of struggle and political participation that allowed great advances in the achievement of the rights of peasants and indigenous people and oppressed sectors of the region. This constitutes a reference to our intention to make visible and revalue a philosophical praxis committed to the historical and social reality.</p> CICSHAL-RELIGACIÓN. CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES EN CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y HUMANIDADES DESDE AMÉRICA LATINA en-US Resistances. Journal of the Philosophy of History 2737-6222 Epistemological resistances and the search for alternatives to modernity in intellectual history <p>The violence of modernity has led to epistemological resistances around the world and the search for alternative ways of reconstructing philosophy. Among the Frankfurt School and early Kyoto School thinkers, for instance, the problem of modernity is framed as an excess of objective rationality, but among the decolonial thinkers of Latin America, the problem is conceptualized as the very myth of modernity itself that has legitimized the colonization and exclusion of non-Europeans. In the search for alternatives modernities, the Kyoto School and Latin American philosophy agree to a vision of inter-civilizational dialogue, which amounts to an engagement of alterity or differences, whereas with the Frankfurt School, albeit struggles to find consensus on how to overcome modernity, aims to merely preclude the problem of reproducing the impulses toward the domination of oneself and others. Nonetheless, all these paradigms have a theoretical point of convergence: that is, since we are all participants of modernity, we are both victims and executioners of its violence, and thus compelled to negate it. This article will discuss how the violence of modernity is experienced, theorized, and then challenged around different continents in order to make visible not just how the violence of modernity is reproduced in different ways but to force ourselves to engage in self-critique in the pursuit to make explicit our own assumptions that repeats the violence of modernity.</p> Dennis Stromback Copyright (c) 2021 Dennis Stromback 2021-11-24 2021-11-24 2 4 e21056 e21056 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.56 Transitional Justice comes to the House: different political times, different expectations <p>In Brazil, Transitional Justice is an idea conceived as a possible strategy to establish in the present a break with the presence of the violent past of the military dictatorship in the present. It’s about an idea that moves between the theoretical field, institutional policy, and social movement. In this paper, we intend to revisit the mentions of this term in parliamentary debates between the years 2007 and 2020 to reflect on the meanings evoked at each register of the term. Furthermore, we hope to explore the political trends that marked the use of the term in the different political times that unfolded during this period of little more than a decade.</p> Paula Franco Copyright (c) 2021 Paula Franco 2021-10-23 2021-10-23 2 4 e21058 e21058 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.58 The pandemic and the writing of the History of Present Time <p>This article will discuss some of the theoretical aspects of the practice of the historian of the Present Time, problematizing the method, the sources and the narrative of the pandemic scenario. The article will use theoretical references that help in the understanding of both the writing of history and its historiographical practice of the Present Time, seeking to demonstrate the importance and the difficulties of the work of the historian who, in addition to taking into account that the phenomena of appearance are only the expression of these determinations, manifested in most cases politically and culturally, and that can be investigated by the History of the Present Time.</p> Michel Silva Copyright (c) 2021 2021-10-16 2021-10-16 2 4 e21059 e21059 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.59 Presentation of the Dossier: Legal, Economic and Political in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right <p>Presentation of the Dossier: Legal, Economic and Political in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right</p> Pablo Pulgar Moya Héctor Ferreiro Copyright (c) 2021 Pablo Pulgar Moya & Héctor Ferreiro 2021-12-31 2021-12-31 2 4 e21071 e21071 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.71 Antecedents of the Theory of Crime and Punishment in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right <p class="p1">This article reconstructs some of the antecedents of Hegel’s theory of crime and punishment in the philosophy of law in the light of the question of the role of coercion in his justification of criminal punishment and his notion of law. It is shown how the normative discussion of punishment and crime implies in his philosophy the question of the legitimacy of criminal law to enforce the law by means of punishment. Likewise, Hegel’s analysis is placed as part of the Enlightenment reform of punishment, and it is proposed to understand his theory as a mixed theory, in contrast with theories that affirm a primarily retributivist reading. The aim of this article is to analyze the theoretical context and historical background of his theory of crime and punishment crystallized in the Berlin Foundations of the Philosophy of Right.<span class="Apple-converted-space">&nbsp; </span>To conclude, it is argued that Hegel’s theory is a mixed theory, i.e., that it combines its retributive character with additional social functions, such as deterrence and rehabilitation, and the thesis that Hegel’s most substantive theory of punishment is contained in Abstract Law is rejected. It is also shown that the full justification of the legitimation of punishment (Strafe) is only achieved in the dimension of the Administration of Justice in the Civil Society section.</p> Ana María Miranda Mora Copyright (c) 2021 Ana María Miranda Mora 2021-12-28 2021-12-28 2 4 e21068 e21068 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.68 Crime and Punishment in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right <p>This article aims to examine the conception that the Philosophy of Right offers of the conscience that fails morally. Hegel’s originality is that he places the problem of evil (and good) around human freedom. Understanding the emergence of evil requires examining the incessant dialectic between the finite nature of the human being and his spiritual nature associated with law and right. In this way, it offers an understanding of crime that does not rest in the depths of the soul, nor the mystery of religion. Crime is a human and therefore can be elaborated a theory of punishment that rests on the dignity and freedom of the guilty. The article aims to show that Hegel offers his own conception of human action, in good and in evil and proposes that, despite its abominable aspect, a reconciliation of the criminal with Life is possible. As a conclusion we suggest that this intelligible dialectic is the one exhibited in Raskolnikov, the central character in Dostoyevsky’s well-known work.</p> Sergio Pérez Cortés Copyright (c) 2021 Sergio Pérez Cortés 2021-12-20 2021-12-20 2 4 e21066 e21066 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.66 Habit and Conflict in Hegel <p class="p1"><span class="s1">Nothing is more habitual than habit. And yet, if we were to follow Aristotle, without it there would be no virtues between us, that is to say: aptitudes and abilities that end up shaping human existence. This essay examines the dialectical development of habitus in Hegel, from Anthropology to Ethicism (Philosophy of Right): on the individual level, from the fetal state and the derangement in the sentient soul to self-sentience and the birth of the ego; on the collective level, it is more concerned with the genesis of habitus and its authors: Corporations, state institutions and public opinion, until we reach the strange stage of habit as the dishabituation of all habit, in the phenomenon of war. It thus highlights the way in which habitus is the crucial mode of being between animal individuality and the sociopolitical body as a mechanical apparatus that promises life and threatens death.</span></p> Félix Duque Copyright (c) 2022 Felix Duque 2022-01-10 2022-01-10 2 4 e21074 e21074 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.74 Hegel’s Morality and the Legal Concepts of Dolus Indirectus and Culpa <p>In the last thirty years, Hegel’s action theory has been at the center of the debate among European and Anglo-American scholars, interested in the questions of human agency and of the agent’s responsibility, showing its relevance from both a moral and a legal perspective. However, the studies that have identified purely legal elements in Hegel’s practical philosophy have mostly focused on the Hegelian doctrine of crime and punishment within Abstract Right, or on the role of the court of law within civil society. The present contribution aims instead at bringing out some of Hegel’s relevant reflections in the juridical field present in the Morality section of the <em>Elements of the Philosophy of Right</em>: the focus will be, in particular, on the concept of <em>dolus indirectus</em>, whose presence and conceptuality can be found in Hegel’s text, as well as in the student’s notes relating to the <em>Lectures on the Philosophy of Right</em>, as well as in the elaborations of Hegel’s direct students, Karl Ludwig Michelet and Eduard Gans (2); on the concepts of <em>culpa</em> and negligence (3), showing how Hegel’s text presents examples of illicit acts which can be traced back to these concepts. In this way, Michelet’s claim that Hegel’s Morality is precisely that ground on which the doctrine of both moral and legal imputation is based will also be corroborated.</p> Giulia Battistoni Copyright (c) 2021 Giulia Battistoni 2021-12-15 2021-12-15 2 4 e21065 e21065 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.65 The Care of Right as the Administration of Justice in Hegel's Philosophy of Right <p>The aim of this chapter is both to illustrate the main moments of the section on the administration of justice (§ 209-229) within the Lineaments of the Philosophy of Right, and to expose some conflicting elements in its understanding. This chapter is separated into three moments: i) it thematizes the task of the administration of justice as a safeguard of law; ii) it characterizes the narrative cohesion of the administration of justice within civil society and its tension with the concept of the State and, finally, iii) the problematic of personalization within the system of law and the interpellation of Marx. The hypothesis that appears, then, is that Hegel tries to prove the necessity of the codification of law in virtue of the defense of personal freedom and property, but which is only possible through judicial power/violence.</p> Pablo Pulgar Moya Copyright (c) 2021 Pablo Pulgar Moya 2021-12-31 2021-12-31 2 4 e21072 e21072 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.72 Right and Duty. Restrictions on Freedom? <p>Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice <em>(Willkür)</em> – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.</p> Klaus Vieweg Copyright (c) 2021 Klaus Vieweg 2021-12-29 2021-12-29 2 4 e21069 e21069 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.69 The Hegelian Understanding of Crime <p class="p1">This paper presents the Hegelian understanding of crime in the Philosophy of Right (1821), according to which there are three differentiated and complementary moments. In the first one, crime is defined in its concept with total independence from what is established by positive law. The crime can be interpreted in objective terms as a contradictory judgment as far as it denies what it affirms: the value of the person. In the second one, it is explained why a criminal action is attributable to a subject. The crime is in subjective terms an action that must be imputed to an actor and to this extent the agent must be aware of its acts and this act must respond to their purpose. In the third one, criminal action is considered based on its social danger. The crime involves, in terms of ethics, not only violence but also defrauding and questioning the social expectations placed in compliance with the State regulations in force.</p> Esteban Mizrahi Copyright (c) 2021 Esteban Mizrahi 2021-12-10 2021-12-10 2 4 e21063 e21063 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.63 Disappearance and Terror: Hegel’s Critique of the Positive Violence of Right <p class="p1">In this paper, I intend to address the relation between law and violence in Hegel’s early writings. I propose to analyze the development of the concept of “positivity” in Hegel’s <em>Early Theological Writings</em> (with a particular emphasis on the fragments written in Frankfurt and known as “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate”) in comparison with Hegel’s analysis of ‘Absolute Freedom and Terror’ in the <em>Phenomenology of Spirit</em>. I contend that the concepts of disappearance and terror that Hegel associates with the latter, are two distinct and differentiated moments of what Hegel in his early writings describes as the violence of positivity. In fact, I show that disappearance and terror are the extreme versions, put to the test in their actualization in the practical world, of the two ‘faces’ of positivity in the Frankfurt fragments. Hegel’s insightful criticism of the violence of the law in these fragments, together with the putting to the test of these ideas in the <em>Phenomenology</em>, provides a very useful set of tools for understanding the risk of a radical form of violence that Hegel sees at the foundation of a paradigmatically modern interpretation of the notion of “sovereignty” and its concrete manifestations in modern conceptions of right and state action.<span class="Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></p> María del Rosario Acosta López Copyright (c) 2021 María del Rosario Acosta López 2021-12-03 2021-12-03 2 4 e21061 e21061 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.61 The Value and Dignity of the Individual in Hegel’s Political Thought <p>Hegel´s social and political thought has been often been interpreted as a defense of authoritarian statism against modern individualism. In this paper I claim, on the contrary, that the value and dignity of the individual is the conclusion of Hegel´s philosophical anthropology and, thus, the principle and foundation of his entire political philosophy. The value and dignity of the individual rely, more precisely, on her freedom of self-determination. The different forms of personal interaction that Hegel develops in his philosophy of Right are thus those that offer the condition of possibility for the exercise of the freedom of self-determination of each individual. Freedom as the capacity to determine oneself does not imply, however, that the goal of human action should be that each individual does whatever she wants. Common good is not the necessary result of the sum of all the actions of the individuals in order to obtain their private well-being; precisely because that is not the case, the common good must be a goal in itself and there must exist a specific organization that takes it as its own goal, namely the State. Indeed, the whole meaning of the State is for Hegel to guarantee that all individuals in society become effectively autonomous agents and can exert their capacity of self-determination.</p> Héctor Ferreiro Copyright (c) 2021 Héctor Ferreiro 2022-01-10 2022-01-10 2 4 e21073 e21073 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.73 The Economy of Civil Society and the Formation of the Civil Subject. Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, §§187-200 <p class="p1"><span class="s1">In §187 of the Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel opens up a topic that is also important for understanding contemporary capitalist societies: How does human subjectivity change, how is it formed under the direction of a social form of relationship that is legally governed by the principles of the private individual and property and economically determined by the production of goods? Hegel notes a characteristic dialectical relationship between the ends of individuals on the one hand and the means available to them in the form of their respective property or non-property. While these means and thus economic relations with other subjects, from a subjective point of view, only have the position of means to their own private ends, conversely, the use of these means in social relations makes the individual the bearer of a function of a social context,<span class="Apple-converted-space">&nbsp; </span>insofar as it does not exist as a consciously pursued end, but as a system of mutual dependence of private subjects on each other. This paper investigates this dialectical relationship with the help of three specific questions, namely: How does this relationship apply firstly to the field of human needs, secondly to the field of human labor, and thirdly to wealth and poverty in bourgeois societies? The paper comes, partly with Hegel, partly going beyond him, to the conclusion that, with all the development of needs, with all the technical progress in production and with all the growth of assets that the “system of needs” produces, we do not have before us a success story of human freedom for all.</span></p> Friedrike Schick Copyright (c) 2022 Friedrike Schick 2022-01-14 2022-01-14 2 4 e21075 e21075 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.75 The Hegelian Theory of Modern Economics <p>The main thesis of this article maintains that the Hegelian theory of modern economics should be understood as an economic philosophy, and not as an economy. Hegel was not an economist like Smith, Say, or Ricardo, but he produced a different kind of economic theory which, as an equally accurate interpretation, deserves much more attention than it has received thus far. The only interpreter who spoke about modern economic theory and Hegelian economic philosophy was Althusser, who used this expression in a rather pejorative sense. Hegel's economic theory was received by many philosophers, from Gans and Marx, to Lukács to Marcuse, but the lack of clarity about the relationship between economics and the philosophical theory of modern economics meant that Hegel was measured by the standards of economic theories such as those of Smith, Ricardo or Marx, and consequently condemned or praised. His achievement in the field of the economic theory of modernity was left in the dark as his theory of bourgeois society and its meaning was superseded by his political philosophy. The aim of this article is to show the specific characteristics of Hegel's economic philosophy.&nbsp;</p> Erzsébet Rózsa Copyright (c) 2021 Erzsébet Rózsa 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 2 4 e21064 e21064 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.64 State against Capital. Comments on the Function of Economy in the Hegelian Philosophy of World History <p>In this article, we will approach the problem of the relationship between the state and capital as an open dispute in modernity between politics and the economy. From the perspective of the Hegelian philosophy of history and right, we will analyze the way in which the economy tends in its structural process of global spatial expansion to subsume and subordinate the administrative and legal functions of state forms prior to the English systemic cycle of capitalist accumulation. For this, we will first analyze the Hegelian conceptualization of political economy, and then expose the specific way in which it is translated into a form of global behavior determined by the processes of differential distribution of capital and thus, finally, address the way in which the economy fulfills its determining functions in shaping the world market and universal history, always having as a direct reference the historical time in which Hegel developed his philosophical reflections on economy.</p> Angelo Narváez León Copyright (c) 2021 Angelo Narváez León 2021-12-07 2021-12-07 2 4 e21062 e21062 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.62 Political Economy and the Question of Freedom: Notes on Hegel and Marx <p>The reception of classical political economy played a prominent role in the development of Hegel’s and Marx's political thought. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, to present the general outlines of the reception of classical political economy in Hegel and Marx; secondly, to evaluate the implications of the reception of classical political economy in the concept of freedom in both philosophers. I argue that the reception of classical political economy, due to different philosophical standpoints, leads Hegel and Marx to develop a different conceptualization of freedom. My main concern was to provide not an exhaustive analysis of the topic but a brief sketch of the implications which different interpretations of political economy have on the question of freedom, indicating, if that should be the case, works that may shed more light on some of the issues addressed throughout the contribution.</p> Márcio Egídio Schäfer Copyright (c) 2021 Márcio Egídio Schäfer 2021-12-30 2021-12-30 2 4 e21070 e21070 10.46652/resistances.v2i4.70