Crime and Punishment in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

Abstract

This article aims to examine the conception that the Philosophy of Right offers of the conscience that fails morally. Hegel’s originality is that he places the problem of evil (and good) around human freedom. Understanding the emergence of evil requires examining the incessant dialectic between the finite nature of the human being and his spiritual nature associated with law and right. In this way, it offers an understanding of crime that does not rest in the depths of the soul, nor the mystery of religion. Crime is a human and therefore can be elaborated a theory of punishment that rests on the dignity and freedom of the guilty. The article aims to show that Hegel offers his own conception of human action, in good and in evil and proposes that, despite its abominable aspect, a reconciliation of the criminal with Life is possible. As a conclusion we suggest that this intelligible dialectic is the one exhibited in Raskolnikov, the central character in Dostoyevsky’s well-known work.